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What the Fraction: A Divisive Look into the Necessary Revisions to the
Department of Interior’s Fractionated Land Buy-Back Program
Amongst Diminishing Funding
David Baxter

I. INTRODUCTION
Following numerous conversations with American Indian 1 tribal leaders
and landowners, the United States Department of Interior (DOI) has decided
to revise its Land Buy-Back Program for Tribal Nations.2 Feedback from
American Indian tribal leaders and landowners was gathered through an open
comment period, a listening session, and numerous DOI meetings.3 The
program will continue to consolidate land, through the use of the remaining
funds received from the Cobell Settlement, which consists of roughly $540
million.4
Associate Deputy Secretary James Cason explained that this latest
revision aims to maximize the remaining resources by reducing the largest
amount of fractionated land as possible. 5 The process of fractionation refers
to the splitting up of a parcel of land, not in a physical sense, but through
multiple undivided interests. 6 Many original allotments now have hundreds
or thousands of individual owners. 7 This becomes an issue because it slows,
and in some case completely stagnates, the land from being used in a
productive way due to different majority consent requirements. 8 Previously,
fractionated lands have lain idle when they could have been used for
residential, agricultural, recreational, commercial, or even cultural purposes. 9

1. The term “American Indian” will be used in lieu of the proper “Native American”
in order to remain consistent with terminology used by the Department of the
Interior and frequented in various Acts and Treaties.
2. Press Releases: Interior Announces Revised Strategy, Policies to More Effectively
Reduce Fractionation of Tribal Lands, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (July 31,
2017), https://www.doi.gov/pressreleases/interior-announces-revised-strategypolicies-more-effectively-reduce-fractionation.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Id.
6. Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T OF THE INTERIOR (Aug.17, 2017),
https://www.doi.gov/buybackprogram/FAQ.
7. Id.
8. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 1.
9. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
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II. BACKGROUND
Beginning with the 1823 decision of Johnson v. M’Intosh, regarding
American Indian land “ownership,” the United States has left tribal lands in
a state of systematic fractionation. 10 The General Allotment Act of 1887, also
known as the Dawes Act, allowed the U.S. government to divide American
Indian lands across the United States for allotment.11 Orchestrated to help
American Indians escape poverty, this Act distributed acreage of lands to
individuals, rather than allowing tribal ownership. 12 Under this Act, the head
of each family would receive 160 acres with each person receiving eighty
acres of American Indian land. 13 The DOI continued to hold this land in trust,
continuing the fiduciary relationship between the American Indians and the
government.14
The Dawes Act led directly to the fractionation problem seen today for
several reasons.15 The Dawes Act contained numerous restraints on
alienation while the land was held in trust by the government, disallowing
American Indians from transferring property at will. 16 Additionally,
succession customs historically used by tribes were continuously ignored in
favor of state laws governing succession. 17 This was illustrated by the fact
that the right of American Indians to write wills was not federally approved

10. Rebekah Martin, Comment, Defending the Cobell Buy-Back Program, 41 Am.
Indian L. Rev. 91, 91 (2016).
11. Id. at 94.
12. Id. (citing Terry L. Anderson, Property Rights Among Native Americans, FOUND.
FOR ECON. EDUC. (Feb. 1, 1997)), http://fee.org/freeman/property-rights-amongnative-americans (“Indian land tenure systems were varied. While some ownership
was completely or almost completely communal, other ownership was more like
today’s fee simple. The degree of private ownership reflected the scarcity of land
and the difficulty or ease of defining and enforcing rights.”).
13. Id. (citing Jered T. Davidson, Comment, This Land Is Your Land, This Land Is My
Land? Why the Cobell Settlement Will Not Resolve Indian Land Fractionation, 35
AM. INDIAN L. REV. 575, 580 (2010-2011)).
14. Id. (citing History of Allotment, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND.,
https://www.iltf.org/resources/land-tenure-history/allotment (last visited Jan. 13,
2016)).
15. Jessica A. Shoemaker, Comment, Like Snow in the Spring Time: Allotment,
Fractionation, and the Indian Land Tenure Problem, 2003 Wis. L. Rev. 729, 740.
16. Id.
17. Id.
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until 1910.18 Expansion of American Indian lands was near impossible as
tribal lands not distributed to individuals were determined to be “surplus” and
opened for white settlement, meaning descendants had no choice but to share
the lands which they held a fractionated interest in. 19 Finally, the Dawes Act
instilled complex rules about leasing permissions, which essentially made it
“easier for Indians to transfer land to Whites, harder for them to transfer it to
other Indians, and much more difficult to reorganize Indian land holdings to
increase efficiency.” 20
In 1996, Elouise Cobell, the treasurer for the Blackfeet Tribe, filed a class
action law suit against the DOI and the U.S. Treasury Department accusing
the Bureau of Indian Affairs of “mismanaging, diverting and losing money
that belongs to Indians” for decades. 21 A settlement of $3.4 billion resulted,
with $1.9 billion specifically earmarked for the “Cobell Land Buy-Back
Program” [hereinafter “Program”]. 22 Consolidation of land that is highly
fractionated is one of the largest goals of the Program. 23
At the genesis of this program, nearly 243,000 individuals owned 2.9
million purchasable fractional interests in 150 reservations across the United
States.24 Out of those owners, the whereabouts of about 13% were entirely
unknown.25 This new decision marks a change in the scope of the Program
from focusing on the potential economic value of the land to simply
increasing a tribe’s title share of land, and allowing the tribe to determine the
use.26 The current program has been fairly successful, reducing fractional
interests by 23% since 2013; this new shift is a decision based in potential

18. Id. at 741 (citing Act of June 25, 1910, ch. 431, § 2 (codified as amended at 25
U.S.C. § 373)).
19. Id. at 40-41 (citing Judith V. Royster, The Legacy of Allotment, 27 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1, 19 (1995)).
20. Id. at 41 (quoting Kenneth H. Bobroff, Retelling Allotment: Indian Property Rights
and the Myth of Common Ownership, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1559, 1614 (2001)).
21. Martin supra note 10, at 104 (citing Christopher Barrett Bowman, Comment,
Indian Trust Fund Resolution and Proposed Reformation to the Mismanagement
Problems Associated with the Individual Indian Money Accounts in Light of Cobell
v. Norton, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 543, 544 (2004)).
22. Martin supra note 10, at 104 (citing Cobell v. Salazar Class Action Website:
Frequently Asked Questions, INDIAN TR. SETTLEMENT,
http://www.indiantrust.com/faq.php.nonsearch (last visited Sept. 7, 2017)).
(NEED TO FIND 3.4 Billion)
23. Martin supra note 10, at 104 (citing Cobell v. Salazar Class Action Website:
Frequently Asked Questions, INDIAN TR. SETTLEMENT,
http://www.indiantrust.com/faq.php.nonsearch (last visited Sept. 7, 2017)).
24. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
25. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
26. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 1.
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economic success, both for tribes and for the Program. 27
So far, this program has spent $1.2 billion, purchasing 40,000 tracts of
land at forty-five different locations, from more than 700,000 fractional
interests.28 To date, 75% of the funds available under the Cobell buy-back
program have been spent, which is the obvious reason for the strategic redirection.29
III.

ANALYSIS

The primary goal of the Program, brought to light following tribal
feedback, is finding a way to leverage available resources for tribal use. 30 To
do so, the DOI will implement policies designed to increase the efficiency
and opportunities at which will consolidate fractional interest, primarily
allocating 51% of the lands to the tribe, so that they have the controlling
interest in the land. 31
A. Necessary Restructuring of the Targeted Audience
The targeted audience of the Program has completely changed with the
latest revisions, as well as the strategy for acquisition. 32 Initially, in 2014,
forty-two tribes were identified as potential beneficiaries of this program. 33
In May of 2016, the Obama-era administration expanded the program to
include 105 tribes, more than doubling the initial audience. 34 This new
Trump-era change to the Program has slashed the audience to just twenty
tribes, twelve of which previously received buy-back offers.35 The DOI will

27. Renae Ditmer, Examining Interior’s Changes to Trust Land Buy-Back Program,
INDIAN COUNTRY TODAY, Sept. 3, 2017,
https://indiancountrymedianetwork.com/news/politics/examining-interiorschanges-trust-land-buy-back-program/.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 1.
31. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 1.
32. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 1 (explaining
the change in the targeted audience to selected number of landowners).
33. Chris D’Angelo, A Hard-Fought Victory To Restore Tribal Land Faces New
Threat In Trump Era, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 8, 2017, 11:04PM),
https://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/ryan-zinke-interior-tribal-landprogram_us_5985042ee4b08b75dcc7043a.
34. Id.
35. Id.
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continuously assess progress, leaving open the possibility to revise the
schedule as resources allow, but many feel this is an unfair change against
the original intent of the program. 36 Opponents of the changes have pointed
out that the five reconsidered reservations out of the twelve are in the
Secretary of the Interior’s home state of Montana, a fact that makes some
question the motives behind this particular change. 37 Additionally, some
argue that this particular change was not among those asked for by American
Indian tribe members. 38 The DOI based these changes on factors including
“the severity of fractionation, appraisal complexity, degree of ownership
overlap between locations or geographic proximity; tribal readiness; past
response rate; and cost and efficiency (including land value).” 39 Regardless,
this narrowing to a more targeted audience is clearly necessary as funding for
the Program begins to dwindle. 40
One of the more fundamental changes in the approach that the DOI is
implementing relates to the strategy for acquisition. 41 This revision will
create a focus on acquiring interests in all mineral-tracts, which have been
determined to not possess viable mineral value, and interests that are less than
twenty-five percent in surface or both type tracts.42 One highlighted problem
of the previous policy was a transaction where $1.63 million was spent to
purchase only three acres from two individuals in southern California. 43 This
strategy will allow for more interests to be purchased because of the
decreased value that comes along with a no longer viable mineral tract, and
hopefully prevent wasting the little funding the Program has left. 44 This
would also allow for the mass consolidation of interests in tracts that control
use of land below the surface, which may lead to more ability to leverage
surface tract sales in the future. 45 By purchasing and targeting the lower

36. Id.
37. See Id.; See also Trump administration moves in new direction with Cobell buyback program, INDIANZ (July 31, 2017),
https://www.indianz.com/News/2017/07/31/trump-administration-moves-in-newdirect.asp [hereinafter Trump].
38. D’Angelo, supra note 33.
39. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
40. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2 (discussing the 1.2
billion dollar that has been spent out of the 1.9-billion-dollar budget).
41. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2 (discussing
the 1.2 billion dollar that has been spent out of the 1.9-billion-dollar budget).
42. See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2 (discussing
the 1.2 billion dollar that has been spent out of the 1.9-billion-dollar budget).
43. See Trump, supra note 37.
44. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
45. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
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percentage interests, the DOI is aiming to maximize the tribal ownership in
as large an area as possible. 46
B. Effective Facilitation of Tribal and Co-Owner Purchases
A big difference illustrated by the Program’s change is the new emphasis
on tribal involvement in the continuation of the Program. 47 Since the Trump
administration has been clear that the project will not receive new funding, a
new resource is needed to continue the Program. 48 This resource has been
determined to be the tribes themselves, and is illustrated by the DOI policy
that tribes who pledge to use tribal funds to purchase back their own lands
will receive priority for the Program. 49 Subsequently, in the name of land
consolidation, co-owners are being encouraged to attempt to purchase coowner interests.50 Again, opponents of this change argue it is against the
original intent of the Program, which was to re-pay American Indians for
years of mismanagement of funds, as opposed to coercing them into
purchasing back their wrongfully divided tribal lands. 51 Additionally, another
goal of the Program change is to make surveyed information available to
tribes, so that they can continue this Program once the federal funding runs
out.52 This information includes mapping and land appraisals, which are
intended to facilitate both landowner-landowner purchases as well as
landowner-tribal purchase.53
C. Beneficial Procedural Changes to the Program
Key procedural changes have been made to the Program directly in
response to tribal feedback, notably to maximize the use of appraisals,
streamline agreements with tribes, and extend the time of purchase offer

46. See generally Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
47. Andrew Westney, Will DOI Have Tribes’ Backs When Land Buy Program Ends?,
LAW 360, (Aug. 4, 2017, 7:39PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/951346?scroll=1.
48. See Interior Announces Revised Strategy, Policies to More Effectively Reduce
Fractionation of Tribal Lands, supra note 2.
49. See Interior Announces Revised Strategy, Policies to More Effectively Reduce
Fractionation of Tribal Lands, supra note 2.
50. See Interior Announces Revised Strategy, Policies to More Effectively Reduce
Fractionation of Tribal Lands, supra note 2.
51. See source cited supra note 37.
52. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
53. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
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validity.54 Previously, an appraisal conducted by the DOI was valid as a fair
market price for a period of nine months. 55 The change implemented
increases the validity of these mass appraisals by three months, allowing for
a total of twelve months. 56 By extending the amount of time that these
appraisals remain valid by over 33%, more time is allowed for tribes to
review purchase offers. 57 This change highlights the infeasibility of reassessment of tribal lands, largely due to the mass-appraisal technique
utilized by the program. 58
Additionally, the DOI is seeking to clarify the parameters and intricacies
of funding, in order to maximize the amount of funding that goes towards
consolidation of land interests. 59 As previously mentioned, the goal is to use
as much of the $1.9 billion for consolidating land interest for tribes, this will
ensure that money is not wasted throughout the many parts of the purchasing
process.60
A third procedural change to the program involves lengthening purchase
offers.61 A purchase offer under the original parameters of the Program would
have lasted for forty-five calendar days from when the original offer cover
letter was dated.62 The DOI has decided to extend this offer deadline to sixty
days, in an effort to help both tribes and current landowners. 63 The 33%
increase in time was implemented because it will allow more time for
landowners to make informed decisions, while still maintaining the
efficiency the Program demands. 64
IV. CONCLUSION
Ultimately, this re-direct in focus to maximize the remaining funds for the
Program is an overall efficient move. 65 There are clearly not enough funds to

54. Andrew Westney, DOI Narrows Scope Of Tribal Land Buy Back Program, LAW
360 (Aug. 1, 2017, 6:13PM),https://www.law360.com/articles/949812/doinarrows-scope-of-tribal-land-buyback-program.
55. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
56. See Westney, supra note 54.
57. See Westney, supra note 54.
58. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, supra note 6.
59. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
60. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
61. See Frequently Asked Questions, supra note 6.
62. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
63. See Trump Administration, supra note 37.
64. See Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, supra note 2.
65. See supra text accompanying notes 30-64.
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“buy-back” the entirety of the land, so it is rather logical that the priority
should go to those lands that will allow maximum purchases, and lead to the
maximum economic development possible. 66 However, it also seems to be an
acknowledgement that the project is wildly under-funded.67 Furthermore, as
it is clear that those presenting the bill were aware it was underfunded, this
change calls attention to the fact that there should have been a prioritization
system from the beginning. 68
Some changes are more concerning than others. While the procedural
changes were clearly asked for by the tribes and helpful to continue the
Program,69 other changes, such as the change in audience, are clearly a
response to the dwindling funds, and not what the tribal members asked for. 70
Furthermore, the methodology in changing the audience was not well
explained, which combined with the conflict of interest involving the
Secretary of the Interior is cause for possible concern. 71 Additionally, the
change in targeted property, while explained primarily as a strategy to reduce
cost, seems against the true intent of the Program: to pay back the American
Indians.72 The aspect of the Program designed to shift the burden of buy-back
to the tribes themselves also seems counter to the original intent of the
Program; this aspect seems to forget that the DOI created this problem over
hundreds of years of mistreatment. 73
Hopefully, the primary legal impact of this Program change will be to
instill in the DOI, and other governmental departments, the necessity to either
fully-fund or create an efficient prioritization plan for programs of this nature
from the start. It should be a requirement for every unfunded program to have
a prioritization plan that is formulated with the limitations in mind because
few programs of this nature are fully-funded. Unfortunately, due to the low
press and attention this issue has garnered, I truly doubt this Program change
will have much legal significance in the long run.
Overall, while these changes are primarily positive, they seem to be
overdue, and should have been implemented at the genesis of this Program
for maximum efficiency. 74

66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

See supra text accompanying notes 30-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-64.
See supra text accompanying notes 30-64.
See generally supra Part III, C.
See generally supra Part III, A.
See generally supra Part III, A.
See generally supra Part III, A.
See generally supra Part III, B.
See generally Part I-III.

